Restructuring Canada's Refugee Determination Process: A Look at Bills C-55 and C-84 by Segal, Brahm
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Note
 
"Restructuring Canada's Refugee Determination Process: A Look at Bills C-55 and C-84"
 
Brahm Segal
Les Cahiers de droit, vol. 29, n° 3, 1988, p. 733-759.
 
 
 
Pour citer cette note, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/042906ar
DOI: 10.7202/042906ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 11:50
Note 
Restructuring Canada's Refugee 
Determination Process : 
A Look at Bills C-55 and C-84 
Brahm SEGAL * 
Bien que le Canada affiche depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale une 
feuille de route généralement enviable en ce qui regarde l'accueil des réfugiés, 
l'existence d'une procédure formelle de revendication du statut de réfugié en 
sol canadien remonte seulement à la mise en œuvre de la Loi sur l'immigration 
de 1976, en 1978. Le nombre de personnes qui se sont prévalues de ce système 
a toutefois excédé grandement ce qui avait été prévu par les fonctionnaires du 
Ministère de l'immigration. Ces derniers, en conséquence, insistent aujourd'hui 
pour que la Loi soit amendée de façon à réduire drastiquement l'accès à la 
revendication du statut de réfugié sur le territoire. 
Les amendements que proposent les projets de lois C-55 et C-84 ne sont 
pas sans rapport avec ce qui s'est fait récemment dans d'autres pays industrialisés, 
spécialement en Europe de l'ouest, où de nombreux obstacles à l'entrée des 
réfugiés ont été dressés. Mais quand on sait que les réfugiés sont au Canada 
protégés par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, il ne fait pas de doute 
que les nombreuses dispositions des projets de lois C-55 et C-84 qui semblent 
porter atteinte à des droits de la Charte vont faire l'objet de contestations 
judiciaires qui, il faut l'espérer, auront pour vertu de définir les obligations 
internationales du Canada à l'égard des réfugiés. 
* Étudiant, Faculté de droit, Université Laval. Ce texte a valu à son auteur la première place 
lors du concours annuel (1987-88) organisé par la Commission internationale des juristes, la 
Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval et la Fondation Maurice-Pollack. Il remercie la 
professeure Nicole Duplé qui l'a dirigé dans son travail. 
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Introduction 
Should Bills C-55 and C-84 ' become law they will radically alter the way 
we adjudicate refugee claims in Canada2. Bill C-55, though premised on the 
principles of simplifying and improving Canada's refugee determination 
process, provides for a screening mechanism which effectively bars universal 
access, includes Immigration Department officials in that initial screening 
1. Second Session, Thirty-third Parliament, 35-36 Elizabeth II, 1986-87. 
2. A matter falling under the paramount jurisdiction of the federal government under 
s. 91(25), 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
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and strictly limits review. Bill C-84, apart from empowering the Minister of 
Employment and Immigration to interdict or turn back ships thought to be 
transporting refugee claimants to our shores, criminalizes the act of assisting 
refugees, stiffens detention provisions, and broadens the basis for excluding 
security risks from the process. Yet paradoxically, the Minister21 has touted 
the Bills as being in full compliance with Canada's international legal 
obligations3, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and this 
country's humanitarian tradition5. 
Detractors on the other hand find the Bills to be in violation of the 
Charter, the Convention and at variance with all the major submissions put 
forward by the blue ribbon committees and individuals who have studied the 
refugee determination process in Canada of late6. 
The fair, humane and expeditious treatment of inland refugee claims is 
both an admirable and long overdue goal. Numerous applicants under the 
existing system spend years awaiting a final determination of their claims, 
time which could be dedicated instead to the difficult job of rebuilding their 
lives. A more efficient determination process also would discourage spurious 
claimants who abuse the claims system simply because they are entitled to 
work in Canada and remain here until they have exhausted their appeal 
rights. 
I. An overview of the history 
of refugee protection in Canada 
The Immigration Act, 19767 established refugees as a class and formalized 
the refugee status determination process for the first time in Canada. Previously 
2a. Former Minister of Employment and Immigration Benoît Bouchard. 
3. A reference to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 
1951, 189 UNTS 150 and to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 
1967, 606 UNTS 267 (hereafter cited as the Convention). 
4. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act, 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). 
5. A shamelessly revisionist view if one considers our less than admirable refusal to take in 
refugees of Nazism before and during World War II. To Canada's credit, it has maintained 
a more liberal attitude to refugee resettlement since then, than have most industrialized 
nations. 
6. Including E. RATUSHNY, A New Refugee Status Determination Process for Canada, May, 
1984; W. GÜNTHER PLAUT, Refugee Determination in Canada, Report to Minister of 
Employment and Immigration, April, 1985. 
7. S.C. 1976-77, c. 52. The principal legal basis for the determination of refugee status in 
Canada at present is this statute (hereafter cited as the Act). 
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the Immigration Appeal Board had been permitted to grant relief on huma-
nitarian and compassionate grounds to de facto refugees who wished to 
remain in Canada. Under the current Act the I.A.B. no longer has the 
freedom to let claimants not falling under the Convention refugee definition 
stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. This power now belongs 
to the Minister's Special Review Committee, which Bill C-55 will dismantle. 
While signatories to the Convention may establish their own criteria for 
refugee selection, the Convention dictates that the principle of non-refoulement 
be observed. In the words of Goodwin-Gill, the principle "[...] states, broadly 
that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to 
face persecution or danger to life and freedom"8. Viewed cynically, the 
signatory's only obligation under the Convention is a negative one, a general 
prohibition against refoulement9. In this reading, the Convention does not 
require a country to provide protection in the form of permanent residence — 
asylum — to refugees, nor does it deny states parties the right to send refugees 
to some other country, provided the latter country does not refoul them. One 
commentator notes that in Canada 
[...] all attempts to [judicially] invoke the provisions of the Convention [...] 
apart from the definition [of a refugee], to provide substantive rights in 
domestic law, have met with failure. [...] despite the legislative policy set out in 
s. 3(g) of the [Act]. I 0 
This result is predictable given the primacy of municipal law over international 
law, although it can often be given effect as a powerful tool for interpreting 
ambiguous domestic laws ". 
8. G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, 
p. 69, 97. 
9. M. SCHELEW, "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill 
C-55", Iss. n° 6, p. 148. 
10. C. J. WYDRZYNSKI, Canadian Immigration Law and Procedure, Auroro Canada Law 
Book, 1983, p. 315. Section 3(g) of the Act acknowledges "Canada's international legal 
obligations with respect to refugees [...]," while s. 2(1) defines "Convention Refugee". 
any person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, 
(a) is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, by reason of such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of his former 
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to 
return to that country. 
11. J. H. GREY, «Canada and Refugees: A case study", discussion paper presented at 
conference on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees under International Law, 
Montréal, 2 Dec. 1987, p. 108. 
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Canada's selection abroad of refugees represents a moral engagement, 
while the inland determination system responds to our international legal 
obligation to consider claims for Convention refugee status made by individuals 
who reach Canadian soil. 
Approximately 95 per cent of the refugees Canada accepts annually are 
processed by Canadian visa officers abroad 12. Selection of this kind is 
discretionary in the sense that there is no obligation to accept an applicant, 
even one who meets the Convention definition and who is judged to have the 
potential for successful establishment in Canada13. Moreover, the selection 
of refugees abroad is not accompanied by the procedural protections that 
applicants to the inland determination process enjoy : an oral hearing ; a right 
to counsel ; to an interpreter ; to reasons for a negative determination ; and, an 
independent decision-maker14. 
Given the dichotomy of "selection abroad" versus "inland determination ", 
one can appreciate how the inland system, with its many time-consuming, 
costly steps is susceptible to break down under an onerous case load. As Dirks 
explains, the current system for refugee determination in Canada proved 
unsatisfactory soon after its genesis : 
[...] the intention was to have a process available to a few individuals already in 
Canada who required protection from a [...] removal order which would result 
in their having to return to their state of origin when a valid fear of persecution 
existed. [...] Without doubt, most officials did not anticipate that hundreds or 
even thousands of claims would be made annually by desperate aliens prepared 
to make use of whatever channel might be available to acquire the right to 
permanent residence.I5 
More numerous than expected, the aliens who have reached Canada and 
applied for Convention refugee status in the 1980's have drawn attention to 
the many flaws in the existing decision-making and review system. 
Since international law binds Convention signatories to perform their 
obligations in good faith16 which, in part, requires the contextual interpretation 
of a treaty's terms in the light of the instrument's object and purpose, concern 
mounted about whether the system Canada had in place for refugee determi-
nation was adequate to the task. In response, governments since the early 
12. E.I.C., Refugee Perspectives 1987-1988, Refugee Affairs Division, Policy and Program 
Development Branch Immigration, June 1986, p. 39. 
13. D. MATAS, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 8, p. 78. 
14. Ibid. 
15. G. E. DIRKS, "A Policy Within a Policy : The Identification and Admission of Refugees to 
Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science XVII : 2, June 1984, p. 279, 301. 
16. A. 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/ Conf. 39/11 / add.2, May 23, 
1969, acceded to by Canada Oct. 14, 1970. 
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1980's have commissioned or elicited mountains of studies, submissions and 
concerned briefs from academics, religious groups, parliamentarians and 
ethnic organizations, culminating in Rabbi Plaut's exhaustive report submitted 
in April, 1985 to the Minister of Employment and Immigration n . 
The release of the Plaut Report coincided with the Supreme Court of 
Canada's decision in Singh et al v. Minister of Employment and Immigration18 
which held that a refugee claimant is entitled to an oral hearing of his or her 
claim by virtue of section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights19 and alternatively, 
section 7 of the Charter. Thousands of claimants, like the appellants in Singh 
had till that point been refused a review hearing before the I.A.B. because it 
was required to screen applications for redetermination and allow to proceed 
to a full hearing only those claims which had, on the balance of probabilities, 
a better than fifty percent chance of succeeding.20. 
The two year delay between the ruling in Singh and the tabling of 
reforms to the system21 created the impression that senior officials of the 
Immigration Department were deliberately delaying the introduction of 
legislation in order to underline the inefficiency and supposed abuse in the 
current system, and thereby generate a backlash calling for restrictive 
measures22. 
The celebrated arrivals by boat of Tamil and Sikh claimants raised fears 
that Canada was losing control of its borders. This perception — at least 
indirectly responsible for the alarmist tone of Bill C-84 — made it difficult for 
proponents of a retailored claims process that would respond to the spirit of 
Singh to get their views across. To this constituency, Bills C-55 and C-84 
represent the triumph of restrictionism in Canadian refugee policy. Instead of 
aspiring to the highest and the best in the field of human rights, we have 
mimicked fellow Western nations which have flexed their sovereign will and 
renounced their commitments to refugee resettlement in recent years23. By 
doing so, Canada has helped to confirm the absence of obligatory force 
behind international refugee law and to expose the validity of Green's dictum 
17. W.G. PLAUT, supra, note 6. 
18. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177;(1985)17D.L.R.(4 th)422;(1985)58N.R. 1 thereafterS.C.R.cited). 
19. R.S.C. 1970, App. HI. 
20. Kwiatkowsky v. M. E. /., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 856, upholding validity of s. 71 (1) of the Act. 
21. Which were necessary because the government deemed unworkable the prospect of 
allowing all claims to proceed to redetermination before the I.A.B. 
22. M. SCHELEW, "Refugee rights at Ottawa's mercy," The Globe and Mail, 9 Dec. 1986, p. A7. 
23. G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, "Refugees: the functions and limits of the existing protection 
system", discussion paper presented at conference on Human Rights and the Protection of 
Refugees Under International Law, Montréal, 1 Dec. 1987, p. 4. 
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that "[...] there is no true institutional recognition or protection of the human 
rights of refugees"24. 
Article 35 of the Convention obliges signatories to cooperate with the 
Office of the High Commission for Refugee, in the performance of its 
protection functions. 
The Executive Committee, in which Canada has participated faithfully, 
facilitates such collaboration. Some consider the standards it has developed 
to be legitimate sources of international law because they represent "A 
unanimous declaration that exhibits the will of the community of nations 
[...]" on whatever issue they address25. Yet because the Office "has no secure 
place of asylum and no formal way to extend [...] protection", its effectiveness 
is "conditioned by the fact of the sovereignty of States"26. And the latter may 
brazenly disregard the Executive Committees recommendations not simply 
because "[...] there are no superpolicemen who enforce the rules" of international 
law27, but also because unambiguous domestic legislation prevails over the 
rules of international law in our constitutional system28. Hence where 
international law conflicts with the Act, "[...] the statute must be applied as it 
stands"283. 
A caveat is called for at this point : though states are the communities in 
which the right of refuge must be realised29, in Canada the Charter has been 
judicially interpreted to provide a check to the Executive's and Parliament's 
will to limit the procedural safeguards available to refugee claimants. 
So stripped of its surrounding rhetoric, the conundrum regarding the 
international legal obligation to protect refugees resolves itself into two 
competing views. One is the internationalist paradigm according to which 
refugee character flows from lack of protection by one's state or the state of 
one's habitual residence30. In counterpoint is the statist paradigm which 
posits that a claimant is not a refugee until recognized as such by a state's 
determination process. Not surprisingly the language of the Convention, the 
Protocol and the U.N.H.C.R. adopt the internationalist paradigm while the 
24. L.C. GREEN, "Institutional Protection of Human Rights", (1987) 28 C. de D. 547, 568. 
25. J. C. HATHAWAY, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 7, p. 39. 
26. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, note 23, p. 19, 21. 
27. J.C. HATHAWAY, supra, note 25. 
28. P. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto, Carswell, 1985, p. 246. 
28a. Ibid. 
29. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, note 23, p. 21. 
30. Early draft (not published) of submission by Canadian Bar Association to Legislative 
Committee on Bill C-55, para. 45. 
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Act [and Bills C-55 and C-84 which will amend it] are cast in the vocabulary of 
the statists, though tempered by jargon borrowed directly from the 
Convention. 
II. Existing procedures for refugee determination in Canada and 
the amendments proposed by Bill C-55 : a thumbnail comparison 
The current legislation contemplates refugee claims only by individuals 
under inquiry for violation of the Act. The making of a refugee claim 
suspends the adjudicators power to issue a removal order, until the claimant 
has had an opportunity to be examined under oath and have his or her claim 
considered. A rare, enlightened feature of Bill C-55 is to cease to distinguish 
between in-status and out-of-status claims ; however, an adjudicator will have 
the power to issue a conditional removal order to a person who makes a claim 
at inquiry. This innovation obviates the need to reconvene an inquiry just to 
issue a removal order subsequent to a negative determination of a claim. 
The Refugee Status Advisory Committee (R.S.A.C.) studies the transcript 
of the examination under oath (E.U.O.) which is conducted by a senior 
immigration officer (S.I.O.). On the advice of the R.S.A.C. the Minister 
determines whether or not a claimant is a Convention refugee. This procedure 
will be replaced under Bill C-55 by an eligibility and credibility screening 
before an adjudicator and Refugee Division member, both of whom would 
have to agree to exclude a claim. This panel will determine access to a full 
hearing before a two-member panel of the Refugee Division, which will 
decide whether the Convention definition applies to the claimant. Although 
the screening hearing is adversarial, the Minister will not be able to interject in 
the hearing before the Refugee Division unless she believes the cessation and 
exclusion clauses of the Convention apply. A single panelist's favorable vote 
results in the acceptance of the claim. 
Currently, negative determinations by the Minister entitle claimants to a 
redetermination before the I.A.B. which renders a decision after hearing 
evidence and submissions from the claimant and the Minister. This constitutes 
the sole oral hearing under the current provisions of the Act. 
The I.A.B.'s decisions are subject to judicial review under section 28 
Federal Court Act31 grounds which will continue to apply to decisions of the 
Refugee Division and the screening panel. Additionally, an appeal on points 
of law will be available to claimants rejected by the Refugee Division, but this 
31. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. I. 
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procedure, like judicial review under the Act, will be subject to leave 
provisions. 
1. Objective restrictions to a full hearing 
1.1. Prior rejection 
Ostensibly to discourage repeat claims, Bill C-55 provides that a person 
who has been excluded or rejected at any level of the claims process and who 
returns to Canada within ninety days of such a decision shall not be eligible to 
make a second claim32. 
An exception to this provision will apply to persons excluded on the 
basis of section 48.01 (1) (b) — safe third country — who either cannot be 
removed to the safe country or have been refused permission to lawfully 
remain there. Under section 48.03 (1), these persons will be allowed to 
recommence their hearing before an adjudicator and Refugee Division 
member who shall inquire into the credible basis of their claim. 
The apparent premise of the prior rejection exclusion is that abusers of 
the claims system will try to reenter it interminably, until they receive a 
favorable disposition. This is unlikely to mean being recognized as a Convention 
Refugee, although the possibility of being landed under an administrative 
backlog clearance program is never to be excluded. Precedents for such 
measures are numerous, the most recent being the Administrative Review 
Program commenced on May 21, 1986 to unburden the claims process 
subsequent to the Singh decision. But the language of Bill C-55, being 
objective, will catch and exclude not only abusers, but also genuine refugees, 
since the adjudicator and Refugee Division member will not have the 
discretion to consider the credible basis for fearing persecution. Critics of this 
provision caution that, 
A person who was not persecuted before but is upon being forcibly returned to 
his country and who manages to leave again, would not have any legal recourse 
to have this considered on his second entry and would be returned again to his 
country.33 
Clearly the only acceptable solution is for Bill C-55 to be amended to allow 
the adjudicator and Refugee Division member to consider the credibility of 
32. Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (1) (c), 48.01 (6) ). 
33. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 67(b). 
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the person's fear of persecution which may have arisen since the person was 
last rejected or excluded from the claims system. Guidelines for the identification 
of spurious repeat claims already are employed by the R.S.A.C. and could be 
transferred to the Act for the purpose34. 
1.2. Late claims 
Bill C-55 proposes that claims made at inquiry be barred if the person 
concerned fails to indicate at the outset his or her intention to request refugee 
status in Canada35. This technical restriction is at variance with the U.N.H.C.R. 
recommendation that failure to submit an asylum request within a certain 
time limit "[...] not lead to an asylum request being excluded from considera-
tion"36. The rationale for this feature of the Bill is obscure. Under the current 
system, most refugee claims are made at the earliest point in the inquiry, 
before the C.P.O. is requested to prove the alleged violation of the Act by the 
person concerned. Nevertheless, a claim may be made at any point in the 
inquiry37. 
It is submitted that no great inconvenience would be caused by preserving 
this aspect of the current claims system, since Bill C-55 will allow the 
Adjudicator to issue a provisional removal order to the claimant regardless of 
when the claim was announced38. Although proposed section 45(1) mandates 
the adjudicator to provide the person concerned an opportunity to indicate 
his or her intention to claim Convention Refugee status, the unrepresented or 
badly represented individual may be prejudiced by the absoluteness of the 
rule in section 45(2), if such a person were ultimately removed to a country of 
persecution. 
1.3. Certified security risks 
The Act currently permits the refoulement of certified security risks and 
other criminally inadmissable individuals found to be Convention Refugees39. 
The novelty Bill C-84 imports is to exclude such persons from gaining access 
34. R.S.A.C, Manifestly Unfounded Claims Guidelines. See W.G. PLAUT, supra, note 6, 
p. 199 for a summary of these guidelines. 
35. Bill C-55, s. 14 (1mm. Act, s. 45 (2) ). 
36. U.N.H.C.R. EXCOM. Cone. N° 15 (xxx), 1979, para. I. 
37. Immigration Act, 1976, s. 45(1). 
38. C. GROOS, "Re Bill C-55, Proposed Amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976 : A 
Critique", an unpublished submission to Legislative Committee on Bill C-55, p. 20. 
39. Immigration Act, 1976, s. 55. 
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to the Refugee Division for a full hearing of their claim40. Moreover the 
specialized tribunal that reviews Ministerial decisions to file a certificate will 
no longer be competent to perform this function in respect of non-permanent 
residents. Instead a designated judge of the Federal Court will assess the 
grounds for the filing of a certificate41. 
1.3.1. Charter implications 
The question of whether permanent residents will be deprived of equal 
justice under section 15 of the Charter is pertinent here. It is not clear why the 
legislator has divested an expert administrative tribunal of this matter. 
Considering the dubious provenance of the information underlying many 
certificates the Minister files42 why should a claimant be deprived of 
S.I.R.C.'s42a procedural safeguards and an extra layer of review? 
1.3.2. Exception to the non-refoulement principle 
Article 33(2) of the Convention permits the refoulement of confirmed 
security risks, but all forms of expulsion are made subject under Article 32 to 
due process — fundamental justice under the Charter — and the existing 
certificate review system seems to favour the subject of the certificate. 
1.4. Safe third country exclusion 
1.4.1. Bill C-55's weakest link ? 
This ground for exclusion from the refugee determination process 
aroused vehement criticism for its implacable objectivity, its overtly political 
character and its anticipated effect of sending refugees into orbit43, or worse, 
refouling then via the safe third country. 
Section 115(1) (r) of Bill C-55 authorizes the Governor in Council to 
prescribe a list of safe countries for the purposes of the exclusionary ground 
40. Bill C-84, s. 5 (Imm. Act, s. 48.1), Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (1) (e) ). 
41. Bill C-84, s. 41 (4). 
42. Toronto Refugee Affairs Council, "An Assessment of Some of the Major Provisions of Bill 
C-84", Sept. 30, 1987 (not published) p. 5. 
42a. The Security Intelligence Review Committee, established by Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service Act, S.C. 1984, c. 21, s. 34 (1). 
43. Meaning when no state accepts responsibility for determining a claim. 
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set out in section 48.01 (1) (b) of the legislation. However, the plain wording 
of section 48.01 (1) (b) does not indicate that ineligibility to make a refugee 
claim will only attach to persons who have a verifiable right to enter the 
designated safe country and to have their claim determined there44. 
Although the onus of proving a claimant has a right to return to a safe 
country and make a claim there lies initially with the Minister's representative, 
the undocumented or falsely-documented claimant will have to rebut the 
presumption that he or she is able to return to the country of embarkation to 
Canada45. The entire prospect of returning someone to a place where that 
person enjoys less than genuine safety compares negatively with the current 
Ministerial practice of allowing that person to make a claim and only 
removing a successful claimant if it is shown that he or she has already been 
accepted as a Convention Refugee in another country. 
Since the adjudicator and Refugee Division member may not digress 
from the Cabinet's decision to designate a particular country as safe, debate 
at this stage of the access hearing will be limited to an examination of whether 
the person has come from that country, whether he can go back, and whether 
if he does go back, he can get a claim there46. Moreover removal under the 
safe country exclusion will take place within seventy-two hours of the 
decision denying access to the Refugee Division47. This time frame, "[...] does 
not even approximate a reasonable period of time within which to gain 
admission to another country" as advised by Article 32(2) of the 
Convention48. 
What motivated the Department to campaign for the safe country 
exclusion was the practice they call "asylum shopping", whereby a claimant 
passes through two or more countries' determination processes, because of 
earlier rejection, to avoid imminent refoulement or merely out of a preference 
for another country despite prior recognition as a Convention Refugee49. The 
Department offers no precise figures on the extent of this supposed 
phenomenon. 
44. Though s. 48.03 provides for the eventuality of the designated safe country not allowing the 
claimant to re-enter its territory, or not determining his or her claim. In such instances the 
claimant shall be allowed to come into Canada and recommence his or her claim from the 
"credible basis" stage of the access hearing. 
45. Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (4) ). 
46. R. GIRARD, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 2, p. 40. 
47. Bill C-55, s. 16 (Imm. Act, s. 51 (1) (b) ). 
48. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 48. 
49. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 42. 
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Bill C-55 intentionally leaves open the possibility of the Governor-in-
Council designating non-signatories of the Convention as safe countries. Nor 
will Bill C-55 ensure that only countries which can provide effective safety to 
the individual be included on the list50. It is thus imaginable that Afghans 
having lived in Pakistan since fleeing their country of origin will be returned 
uniformly to Pakistan, which does not adhere to the Convention and does not 
protect all Afghans equally51. Admirable as it is, the fact that Pakistan 
provides protection to most Afghans does not allow Canada to depend on 
Pakistan to never refoul an Afghan who falls under the Convention definition 
of refugee, because Pakistan has not undertaken that obligation in the legal 
sense52. 
1.4.2. A workable version 
Opponents of the safe country exclusion as it now stands generally admit 
that it could be redrafted to conform with our obligation to protect refugees 
from refoulement53. This result could be achieved by amending the Bill to 
specify that a safe country is a Convention signatory, that respects its treaty 
obligations and can extend to the individual concerned the right to enter its 
territory and have his or her claim determined there on the merits54. A 
minority of the Bill's critics maintain the view that the Convention and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights55, to which Canada is also a party, 
allow a claimant to choose his or her country of asylum56. This proposition is 
extravagant for the time being because Parliament has not incorporated into 
domestic law the provision that "Everyone has the right [...] to enjoy in [...] 
[Canada] asylum from persecution"57, and the provisions of the Convention 
enacted to date in Canadian legislation are the definition of refugee58 and the 
non-refoulement principle59. 
Essentially, Bill C-55 must recognize the possibility of a country being 
safe for the majority of individuals who can return to it, but not for everyone. 
50. Id., p. 24. 
51. M. SCHELEW, supra, note 9, p. 131. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Immigration Act, 1976, s. 55 ; United Nations Convention, supra, note 3, Art. 33. 
54. M. SCHELEW, supra, note 9, p. 137. 
55. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 10 Dec. 1948, UN Doc. A/810. 
56. D. RACICOT, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 6, p. 105 ; C.B.A., supra, note 30, 
para. 38. 
57. Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, Art. 14(1). 
58. Immigration Act, 1976, s. 2 (1). 
59. Id., s. 55. 
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By granting the adjudicator and Refugee Division member the discretion to 
make the finding that the person concerned may not be able to rely on the 
protection of the designated safe country, the individualized element of 
refugee determination would be restored to the process, and the risk of 
indirectly refouling genuine refugees consequently diminished60. The Depart-
ment's argument for not having to consider the effective protection that an 
individual might expect in a safe country is fraught with circularity : 
In the case of a safe third country, you do not have to hear the testimony, 
because you are sending that person to a country that has been determined to be 
safe and is not his own. [my emphasis].6I 
Another factor that could inform the cabinet's determination — aside from 
the country's respect for human rights — might be the desire to avoid 
offending a country with which Canada maintains good diplomatic relations. 
1.4.3. On a collision course with Singh 
It has also been observed that direct refoulement will be possible 
pursuant to a safe country exclusion because technically the person concerned 
will not have been identified as a Convention Refugee, so the provision in 
section 55 of the Act forbidding refoulement will not be triggered. Moreover, 
the adjudicator only issues the removal order ; choice of country of removal 
under section 54(2) of the Act is left to the Enforcement Branch of the 
Department and they will not be under any legal constraint to remove the 
person only to a safe third country62. 
In the Singh case, Wilson J. held that a claimant was entitled « [...] to rely 
on this country's willingness to live up to the obligations it has undertaken as 
a signatory to the [...] Convention [...]"63. After determining that section 7 of 
the Charter applied to all persons physically present in Canada, regardless of 
their immigration status64, Wilson J. concluded that the principles of funda-
mental justice required that a claimant be given an oral hearing where a threat 
to that person's life, liberty or security existed65. 
60. Although proposed s. 115 (1) (r) directs the Governor-in-Council to have regard to a 
country's treatment of "persons of a specified class of persons", it cannot be said for certain 
that this clause will prevent Salvadoreans from being returned to the U.S.A. which accepts 
very few Salvadorean claimants compared to Canada. 
61. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 40. 
62. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 59. 
63. Supra, note 18, p. 193. 
64. Id., p. 203. 
65. Id.. p. 211. 
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Considering that many claimants will not get beyond the safe country 
exclusion in the determination process, it is fair to ask whether claimants so 
curtailed in presenting their case will have been accorded an oral hearing as 
contemplated by Singh. Detractors of the screening process note that though 
it 
[...] will be in the form of an oral hearing which differs from the written 
screening process attacked in the Singh case [...] this difference is not substantive, 
because the adjudicator and Refugee Division member at this stage in the 
screening hearing must apply non-discretionary rejection criteria. They are 
precluded when considering eligibility to make a refugee claim, from looking at 
the merits of the claim.66 
One has to conclude that the legislator erred in failing to confer discretion 
upon the decision-makers in the access hearing to hear evidence about why a 
designated safe country cannot provide adequate protection to the person 
concerned. 
[Purportedly, senior immigration officers (S.I.O.'s) will vet "effective 
safety" separately and will have special review powers to consider landing 
claimants on compassionate and humanitarian grounds. How diligently 
enforcement officials, whose everyday concern is to remove people alleged to 
have violated the Act, will try to facilitate their entry on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds or otherwise, remains the subject of speculation67.] 
1.4.4. Burden sharing 
Exclusion based of safe third country goes to the heart of the issue of 
burden sharing. Refugee-receiving countries in Western Europe and North 
America, though not primarily countries of first asylum, have latterly attempted 
to regionalize refugee movements by keeping those in need of protection 
within their regions of origin : 
This objective is pursued by the imposition of visa and transit visa requirements ; 
by sanctions against airlines which carry undocumented or otherwise inadmissible 
passengers; by socio-economic measures of deterrence such as prohibiting 
employment or limiting social benefits [...] and by procedural devices designed 
to avoid decisions on the merits in favour of rapid removal to some other 
country deemed to be responsible or secure, or on the ground that the applicant 
for asylum has spent too long in transit, or could have sought protection 
elsewhere.68 
66. C.B. A., supra, note 30, para. 52. 
67. B. JACKMAN, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 3, p. 13. 
68. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, note 23, p. 4. 
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As this passage shows, many of the devices Bill C-55 adopts to deter refugees 
from selecting Canada as a country of asylum have been imported from other 
refugee-receiving countries. However, a major distinction applies to the 
European varieties of the "safe country" rule. By and large, exclusion on this 
ground amongst Western European countries is governed by multi-or bilateral 
agreements specifying which national jurisdiction will be responsible for 
determining a particular claim69. Unless Canada becomes a party to such 
European style agreements, the claimants we remove on the basis of safe third 
country will bounce from one frontier to the next seeking protection in vain, 
because we will be perceived by other refugee-receiving countries as fobbing 
off an unjust portion of our refugee burden in disrespect of international 
comity. 
1.5. A quasi-objective coda to the access hearing : 
the credible basis test 
The second stage of the access hearing for claimants not determined to be 
ineligible on the basis of prior protection, prior rejection, an existing removal 
order, failure to make a timely claim at inquiry, safe third country, or being 
the subject of a security certificate, is the credible basis examination70. 
1.5.1. Why have it? 
According to the Department, the credible basis examination is "[...jsimply 
intended to identify if there is an arguable case"71. The C.P.O., being the 
Minister's representative at the inquiry will move that the claim proceed to a 
determination before the Refugee Division once he is satisfied, upon a 
summary presentation of the claimant's evidence, that a supportable claim to 
protection is made out72. Should the claim not proceed to a full hearing by 
consent of the Minister73, the adjudicator and Refugee Division member 
must form an opinion as to whether a credible basis exists. A favorable 
decision by either decision-maker sends the claim on to the Refugee 
Division74. 
To help guide the adjudicator and the Refugee Division member on this 
point, the legislator has provided two formal indicators in section 48.01 (6) 
69. C.B.A., supra, note 30, paras. 61-65. 
70. Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (6) (7) ). 
71. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 13. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Bill C-55, s. 14 (1mm. Act, s. 48.01 (7) ). 
74. Id., (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (6) ). 
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which must be considered : a country's human rights record and the disposition 
under the Act of past claims by nationals of that country. 
Clearly the "credible basis" test is designed to counter abusive claims. 
The Department insisted on this procedural hurdle to discourage the clogging 
of the system by frivolous claims, such as those proferred in recent years by 
significant numbers of Portuguese, Brazilian and Turkish nationals75. An 
anti-abuse measure that truly preserved the integrity of our refugee determination 
process would have been a welcome improvement to the Act. Unfortunately, 
the legislator introduced a novel standard for achieving this screening 
function, in that credible basis is not a legal term of art, unlike the "manifestly 
unfounded claim" (M.U.C.) standard which has been developed by the 
U.N.H.C.R. Executive Committee and is currently employed by the 
R.S.A.C.7«. 
Stern points out that the M.U.C. standard supports the principle that, 
[...] no case should be screened out where there is any evidence produced 
relating to torture, detention, general abuse arising from lack of protection, 
denial of education, employment, housing, food or so forth, provided [...] that 
such treatment was related to one of the five grounds stated in the 
Convention.77 
The legislator deliberately shunned this low threshold for something "[...] a 
little stronger [...]"78. What is not known is whether, as the Department 
suggests, "a shred of evidence", with "some corroboration" will suffice to 
have the claim referred to the Refugee Division79, or, as detractors of the test 
fear, people "[...] who may have a prima facie claim to recognition as a refugee 
could be rejected without a full hearing" because of minor contradictions in 
their evidence, or a demeanour which raises even the slightest of doubts about 
credibility in the mind of the decision-makers80. 
1.5.2. Is this an oral hearing ? 
In striking down a previous legislative credibility screen under the Act, 
the Singh case did not merely establish that section 7 Charter rights applied to 
all aliens physically present in Canada ; the court specified that the consequences 
of an erroneous negative determination in a refugee claim were so grave that 
75. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 13. 
76. Both Plaut and Ratushny endorsed variants of the test in their reports. 
77. M. FALARDEAU-RAMSAY, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 2, p. 55. 
78. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 15. 
79. Ibid. 
80. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 78 (iii). 
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fundamental justice required an oral hearing, before the decision-maker, with 
right to counsel and proper consideration of the case upon the merits81. 
Since the credibility screen, by the Department's own estimates, will 
eliminate about two-thirds of all claimants82 the quality of the access hearing 
gives pause to critics of Bill C-55 who stress that a preliminary consideration 
of credibility cannot be equated with a determination of the issue on the 
merits in the spirit of Singh83. 
1.5.2.1. Discretion : how real? 
As first drafted, section 48.1(6) suggested that credibility screening 
would be based on the objectively discernible factors listed in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of that subsection. To legislate such a static test would, of course, 
prejudice claimants from new refugee-producing situations84 and favour, or 
at least be neutral towards asylum seekers from traditional countries of 
persecution. Matas observes that the test so framed would have amounted to 
a statutorily directed suspicion against the person from a country with a high 
rejection rate85. This factor, combined with the lag commonly observed 
between the outflow of information on contemporary persecution and its 
occurrence, especially in "closed countries"86 would amount to a virtually 
irrebuttable presumption against credibility. 
Revisions to Bill C-55 have since clarified that a subjective element is 
involved in the assessment of credibility at the screening hearing87. While at 
first blush this amendment invests the adjudicator and Refugee Division 
member with the discretion to inquire into the individualized dimension of a 
claimant's history, to form an opinion about his or her credibility, this 
discretion remains eminently unstructured. Neither the Act nor Bill C-55 
directs the decision-maker to go beyond a mechanistic application of the two 
compulsory factors in section 48.01 (6)88. 
The obvious concern here is that the adjudicator and Refugee Division 
member will make a fetish of relying on the statutory factors enshrined in 
81. B. JACKMAN, supra, note 67, p. 26. 
82. V. MALAREK, "Most refugees to be rejected, document says" The Globe and Mail, 
Wednesday, 3 Feb. 1988, p. Al. 
83. B. JACKMAN, supra, note 67, p. 26. 
84. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 78 (ii). 
85. D. MATAS, supra, note 13, p. 113. 
86. M. SCHELEW, supra, note 9, p. 131. He gives North Korea as an example. 
87. Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (6) ), addition of word "including". 
88. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 40. 
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section 48.01 (6) and not address other meaningful indicators of fear of 
persecution. As Hathaway comments : 
[...] claims can legitimately be made out in respect of persons from countries 
that have otherwise good human rights records 
and the conclusion that any particular case lacks credibility does not flow 
inevitably from the failure of similar cases89. Put simply, every country has its 
first refugee. 
Whether or not they anticipate rejection at the screening stage, responsible 
counsel will enter as much evidence as they have gathered in support of their 
client's claim, to create a record for the contingency of judicial review of the 
screening process90. Conceivably then, the time required for an access 
hearing will not be less than what it would take to hear the claim in its entirety. 
Thus by not having the Refugee Division step in and hear the claim in its 
entirety at the credible basis stage, the legislator is encouraging multiplicity of 
proceedings. 
1.5.2.2. Adjudicators : how independent? 
Conferring the matter to the Refugee Division at this point would 
obviate the need to have an adjudicator judge credibility in refugee matters. 
It is a principle of fairness and natural justice that decisions be taken by 
independent, fair and impartial decision-makers " . Adjudicators, as officials 
of the Immigration Department "[...] whose duties and careers are lodged 
firmly in the administration of the immigration program"92, are ill-suited, 
institutionally, to pass judgment on the credibility of refugee claimants. 
The primary ground for this assertion is that immigration concerns are 
irrelevant to refugee determination93. An open-minded approach to the 
assessment of credibility in a refugee claim will require that adjudicators 
detach themselves from the manner in which they assess credibility in 
immigration matters94. In theory, the decision to detain the person concerned, 
to set a high bond, or to issue a conditional removal order should not impact 
upon credibility in a refugee claim. However, the appearance of an official 
who is charged with finding out whether or not a person has violated the Act, 
89. J.C. HATHAWAY, Media Release, Osgoode Hall Law School, Sept. 4, 1987, p. 6. 
90. B. JACKMAN, supra, note 67, p. 18. 
91. See Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
92. J. STERN, supra, note 77, p. 56. 
93. C.B.A., supra, note 30, para. 85(e). 
94. Ibid. 
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also being given a say as to whether Canada should extend protection to the 
same person, is queer. One also wonders to what extent the Refugee Division 
member, who must be present while the adjudicator alone rules on admissibility 
and removability, will "[...] be adversely influenced by the immigration issues 
dealt with by the immigration adjudicator"95. Quite possibly, the screening 
mechanism devised by Bill C-55 will blur the distinction between the independent 
decision-makers and officials who may despite their best efforts be captive of 
an enforcement mentality. 
Among the U.N.H.C.R. minimum standards for refugee determination 
is a recommendation that "a single central authority" be given "[...] responsibility 
for examining requests for refugee status and taking a decision in the first 
instance"96. This principle, if respected, would bolster the legitimacy of the 
refugee determination process because a single central body would likely 
produce consistent decisions, which could be of lasting precedent-value. The 
wisdom of establishing such an authority on a review level is all the more 
compelling, and is even practicable despite the geographic and demographic 
imperatives that would frustrate an attempt to centralize decision-making at 
first instance in Canada. As we know, however, the legislator opted to forego 
creating any kind of review body97. And while Bill C-55 laudably creates an 
expert tribunal — the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board — whose panels, no doubt, will competently apply the refugee 
definition, the integrity of the process will be tainted by the participation of an 
adjudicator in the screening process. 
2. The fine line between efficiently administering the Act and 
trampling on claimants' rights 
2.1. Summary scheduling of the process 
Other aspects of the access hearing have made the legislator the target of 
rebuke. On the premise that a speedy process deters abuse, it is foreseen that 
the access hearing will take place within seventy-two hours of arrival in port-
of-entry claims98. While this delay may provide ample preparation time for a 
frivolous claim, it may be insufficient for many bona fide ones. Even the most 
95. Ibid. 
96. UN Doc. A/AC 96/549, para. 53.6 (d) (e). 
97. Despite Plaut's Report, two of whose three proposed models included such review. 
98. V. MALAREK, supra, note 82. 
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experienced counsel occasionally have difficulty elucidating relevant facts 
from claimants who are later found to be Convention Refugees by the 
Minister. It is thought that the processing time envisaged by the Department 
will work particular hardship on Asian and Latin American women whose 
claims involved a sexual component". 
The Charter implications of too expeditiously convening an access 
hearing focus on whether it is consonant with the principle of fundamental 
justice to so restrict preparation time where the consequences of wrongful 
exclusion and removal could affect a person's life, liberty and security ; and 
secondly, whether the provision offends section 15 by more rapidly processing 
refugee claimants through their hearing than is the case with claimants of 
other rights, similarly situated. In Streng et al v. Township of Winchester l0°, 
Smith J. of the Ontario Supreme Court held that the three month limitation 
period for suing municipalities for negligence was unreasonable because the 
quality of the defendant is not a valid basis for restricting the injured party's 
right of action. In so ruling on a section of the Ontario Municipal Act101 the 
Court noted the validity of the principle in MacKay v. The Queen 102 to the 
effect that variations from the general principle of universal application of the 
law to meet special conditions and to attain a necessary and desirable social 
objective. Nevertheless, Smith J. concluded that despite the temptation to 
defer to the legislators "[...] when they choose to impose limitations on the 
right of access to the courts,[...]" such deference was not possible in the face of 
an "[...] extremely short [...] limitation period [...]"103. 
By analogy, the Minister could invoke section 1 of the Charter on the 
ground that a summary access hearing dissuades spurious claimants from 
coming into Canada and burdening our claims system. However, this objective 
could be accomplished by less drastic means. One possible alternative would 
be to extend the preparation time for the access hearing but restrict employment 
authorizations to persons whose claims are referred to the Refugee Division. 
2.2. Adversarial hearings 
Even if one accepts the Department's position that the Minister should 
be represented at the access hearing because of the "[...] convergence of 
99. A. deWolff, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 8, p. 88, 89. 
100. 56 O.R. (2d) 649. 
101. R.S.O., c. 302, s. 284 (2). 
102. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370. 
103. Supra, note 100, p. 658. 
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immigration considerations and refugee protection considerations [...]" 104> it 
is hard to justify the C.P.O.'s presence once the adjudicator and Refugee 
Division member move on to the credible basis assessment. 
Currently, the C.P.O. is a passive actor in the claims process because his 
or her role is not to cross-examine the claimant or otherwise contest the claim 
or question demeanour at an examination — under oath. Bill C-55, however, 
will allow the C.P.O. to challenge a claim from the moment the person 
concerned indicates an intention to seek protection under the Convention 
right through to the adjudicator and Refugee Division member's decision on 
whether to refer a claim with a credible basis to a full hearing. 
This mutation will be particularly prejudicial to the claimant who 
proceeds with inexperienced or incompetent counsel, or alone. The Department 
has stated that it will not challenge well-founded claims l05, yet Bill C-55 fails 
to formally limit the C.P.O.'s mandate to attempting to impeach only clearly 
unfounded claims. 
2.3. Limiting choice of counsel 
Since Bill C-55 places a premium on expeditious processing, the port-of-
entry claimant will have to find counsel who is ready to proceed within 
seventy-two hours or accept counsel appointed by the Minister106. The 
scenario of someone who need not even be a lawyer, much less one experienced 
in refugee law, arguing in an adversarial setting against his or her employer's 
representative, the C.P.O., brings into question the vigour with which a 
claimant's case will be put forward. 
The Charter provides a right to select one's counsel where a person is 
detained 107 and the right may be read into section 7, as a principle of 
fundamental justice in access hearings, because of the serious stakes involved 
in refugee determination l08. The reasonableness of section 30(2) in Bill C-55 
would depend on the necessity of a speedy hearing and availability of 
alternative means to ensure such an end could be achieved. In other words, 
moving a case load efficiently through the access stage may be a valid concern 
and a desirable goal if it proves to deter frivolous claims. However this 
104. Admissibility and removability are the usual matters which the C.P.O. addresses on behalf 
of the Minister ; eligibility for protection under the Convention is not presently a matter on 
which the adjudicator is competent to rule. 
105. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 16, and see Bill C-55, s. 14 (Imm. Act, s. 48.01 (7) ). 
106. Bill C-55, s. 9 (Imm. Act, s. 30 (2) ). 
107. Id., s. 4 (Imm. Act, s. 10 (b) ). 
108. Singh, supra, note 18, p. 211. 
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objective could be achieved satisfactorily if the adjudicator, who presides at 
the access hearing, were to set peremptory dates for hearings when of the 
opinion that requests for adjournment amounted to an abuse of process109. 
The setting of peremptory dates would be compatible with the exercise by 
claimants of the fundamental right to counsel of choice. 
2.4. Limiting review 
Bill C-55 proposes to limit appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal by 
leave and to points of law and jurisdictional grounds only n o . Critics of the 
legislation had hoped for an appeal by right, to an expert body and on 
grounds of both law and fact ' ' '. The leave restriction applies both to appeal 
and review of Refugee Division decisions and to review of decisions made by 
the adjudicator and Refugee Division member in the access hearing"2. 
Finally, section 85.1 of Bill C-55 removes the possibility of appealing to the 
Supreme Court of Canada from the decision of a judge of the Federal Court 
of Appeal denying leave to appeal under section 83.3. 
2.4.1. At variance with the minimum standard 
The limited review aspect of Bill C-55 abrogates the U.N. H. C.R. guideline 
that an applicant found not to be a Convention Refugee at first instance be 
given "[...] aformal reconsideration of the decision" "3 . And the provision to 
remove claimants pending review of the finding that their claims lack a 
credible basis may be at variance with the U.N.H.C.R. recommendation that 
claimants " [...] be permitted to remain in the country pending decisions on 
the initial request by the competent authority [...] unless [...] the request is 
clearly abusive" ' u , if the competent authority charged with taking a decision 
at first instance is considered to be the Refugee Division, and not the decision-
maker at the screening hearing. 
The Department is conscious of the divergence between the internationally 
developed guidelines on review and the limited character of appeals in Bill C-
55. The drafters of this legislation emphasize that the U.N.H.C.R. guidelines 
109. B. JACKMAN, supra, note 67, p. 34. 
110. Bill C-55, s. 19 (Imm. Act, s. 83.3 (1) ). 
111. D. MATAS, supra, note 13, p. 79. 
112. No appeal lies from the decision not to allow access to the Refugee Division and the person 
concerned has no right to remain in Canada while the application for leave for judicial 
review is considered. 
113. Supra, note 96. 
114. Ibid. 
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"[...] are not binding [...] they are suggestions"11S. While the latter proposition 
may be valid, modern legislators have greatly attenuated the harshness of the 
common law presumption that appeals are statutory, by extending appeal 
rights at least partially to issues of fact in many domains, including monetarily 
insignificant civil actions and petty criminal offences 116. This causes one to 
wonder whether section 15 of the Charter would support the view that 
refugee claimants should be given the same appeal rights as those enjoyed by 
similarly situated applicants in other matters. And while the legislator may 
fear that an appeal by right, on the merits will invite abuse of the refugee 
claims system afresh ' n Bill C-55 itself may prompt the courts to declare that 
the legislation is not in compliance with section 7 of the Charter. This could 
be the case if fundamentaljustice in the matter of refugee claims is interpreted 
to mean an appeal on the merits, before a competent body, with a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare one's case and the right not to be removed pending the 
decision 118. 
2.4.2. The domain of fact in refugee determination 
Review on the merits and not simply on the ground of legality is a sine 
qua non of even the most sophisticated determination process. As the current 
Chairman of the R.S. A.C. has observed on the basis of his own experience : 
If there is no review or appeal on merits, there is no opportunity to reverse errors 
in individual cases and there will inevitably be inconsistency in decision-
making. " 9 
Although refugee determination is one of the last areas of law where issues of 
life and death can arise, the current determination process at times makes it 
difficult to see the difference between applications that have been accepted 
and those that have been rejected l2°. This will continue to be the result under 
Bill C-55 because refugee claims are decided primarily on the facts and on the 
applicant's credibility. Only now there will be no opportunity to give sober 
second thought to the decision-makers' appreciation of these two 
determinants. 
Arguably, review on the merits is a necessary component of fundamental 
justice in a matter with such potentially grave consequences as refugee 
115. R. GIRARD, supra, note 46, p. 17. 
116. F. ROTTER, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 8, p. 67. 
117. See Bill C-84, s. 1 (Imm. Act, s. 2.1 (b) ), and C. GROOS, supra, note 38, p. 41. 
118. W. ANGUS, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 7, p. 40. 
119. M. FALARDEAU-RAMSAY, supra, note 77, p. 56. 
120. J. H. GREY, Immigration Law in Canada, Toronto, Butterworths, 1984, p. 122, 123. 
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determination, which, as the Singh case indicated goes to the life and liberty 
of the person concerned m . What critics of Bill C-55 would like to see it 
provide is some form of review, even by way of written submissions, before an 
expert body and not the Federal Court which is a body of first impression >22. 
If the legislator is concerned that additional procedural rights will invite 
abuse by spurious claimants, it can remove them pending review. The 
Department projects that less than one in three claims will proceed to a 
hearing before the Refugee Division, and that a third of these will be 
rejected 123. Based on these expectations, a relatively less significant proportion 
of claimants will get an appeal than is the case now with an automatic right to 
redetermination before the I. A.B. Hence to add a review of the merits to the 
grounds for appeal would not overburden the administrative resources of the 
new system. In any event, if an appeal on the merits were held to be a 
component of fundamental justice in refugee determination then administrative 
convenience could not be invoked to justify the restriction on an appeal to 
points of law alone 124. 
Groos suggests that if the Refugee Division's determinations are not 
reviewable for error of fact, that it at least be given an ongoing jurisdiction to 
reopen a rejected claim where relevant evidence, perhaps by the claimant's 
own fault, was not put before it ; "or because of a significant change in the 
material circumstances of the claimant"125. The latter ground refers to the 
phenomenon of becoming a refugee sur place, since the claim was rejected. 
Any such reopening of a claim would require the applicant to demonstrate the 
plausibility of the ground invoked for having the Refugee Division seize itself 
of the matter again126. 
2.5. Detaining the undocumented 
Article 31 of the Convention forbids the imposition of penalties on 
refugees who promptly come forward and show cause for illegally having 
entered a country. Yet section 104.1 of Bill C-84 provides for a longer initial 
121. Supra, note 18, p. 207. 
122. See J. H. GREY, supra, note 120, p. 162 where he states that it would not be realistic to 
expect the courts to become the champion of the refugee, irrespective of the Charter, as they 
have long viewed refugee determination to be a subset of immigration control, while 
immigration is perceived by the judiciary to be "[...] an area of law in which administration 
is to be made easy, subject to the exigencies of strict legality". 
123. V. MALAREK, supra, note 82. 
124. Singh, supra, note 18, p. 218. 
125. C. GROOS, supra, note 38, p. 42. 
126. Ibid. 
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detention period in respect of unidentified claimants than is currently permitted 
under the Act127. Moreover Bill C-84 criminalizes the act of providing advice 
to undocumented persons about "coming into Canada" to make a claim l28. 
This provision may well have a chilling effect on humanitarian advice giving. 
2.6. Turning back of ships 
Section 91.1 of Bill C-84 permits the Minister to redirect ships away from 
our borders when the Minister has reason to believe the persons on board are 
being brought into Canada in contravention of the Act. The language of the 
section covers as insignificant an offense as not possessing a visa where one is 
required. Opponents of this provision point to less drastic methods to achieve 
the intended purpose of securing our bordersI29. Repugnant as this aspect of 
the Bill appears, its mere enactment and promulgation are not violative of the 
Convention l3° ; the result of the provision however, might constitute a breach 
of our non-refoulement obligation131 and section 7 of the Charter as interpreted 
in Singh. 
Finally, this measure which prospectively strikes one as an engine of 
refoulement — since no one on the redirected vessel will get an opportunity to 
establish his other right to protection under the Convention — might 
succumb to the proportionality test in R. v. Oakes132. While the deleterious 
effects of the Minister's power to redirect are not hard to imagine, the 
objective of regaining control of our jeopardized frontiers seems entirely 
overblown. 
Conclusion 
The vision of refugee determination in Bills C-55 and C-84 is consistent 
with the view that "[...] first asylum is not our primary role [...]" in the effort to 
solve the global refugee problem l33. The perennial discrepancy between the 
numbers of government selected refugees versus Convention Refugees landed 
each year attests to this policy preferencel34. 
127. Compare with Immigration Act, 1976, s. 104 (6), Forty-eight hours limit. 
128. Bill C-84, s. 9 (Imm. Act, s. 95.1). 
129. See supra, note 42, p. 14, 15. 
130. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, note 8, p. 143. 
131. Ibid. 
132. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
133. R. GIRARD, "Minutes of...", supra, note 9, Iss. n° 3, p. 53. 
134. Supra, note 12, p. 39. 
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Now Canada is taking its bias in favour of selecting refugees one step 
further by refusing to accord protection to claimants who are shown or 
deemed to have had a opportunity to seek it elsewhere. 
The reluctance to give refugee applicants enforceable rights, or to invest 
the courts and statutory tribunals with wide jurisdiction may be symptomatic 
of what Grey identifies as "[...] the growing influence of bureaucrats who wish 
to retain as much power to grant relief in their administrative hands", with the 
result that relief when granted "[...] will be a matter of grace, not right"135. 
One cannot predict whether the grasping nature of the Immigration 
bureaucracy is even approaching its apogee. But the tenor of Bills C-55 and C-
84 is certainly a far cry from the provisions of the Convention, which seems 
less relevant each day, premised as it is on the lawful residence or tolerated 
presence of the refugee, whom the host state aimed to assimilate 136. 
Yet for persons who make their claims in Canada, at least, their is a 
counterpoids to this restrictionist force, and that, of course, is the Charter. It 
has proven to be a powerful shield for vulnerable parties — refugee claimants 
and criminal accused, notably — and it undoubtedly will be invoked to 
restore the core principle of the international refugee protection system that 
effective safety requires access to the determination process. 
135. J.H. GREY, supra, note 11, p. 122. 
136. G.S. GOODWIN-GILL, supra, note 23, p. 19. 
